...if your capital city is burning

How Bush decided on the surge.

The link is the title of a fascinating article describing the process inside the Bush administration that lead to the strategy known as the surge.

Here are some key quotes (emphasis in bold added), together with some of my own commentary. It may be a bit confusing for anyone who hasn't been following the Iraq story since day one, but then even the article itself assumes the reader will be highly informed of all the twists and turns that have plagued the Bush presidency in his effort to bring freedom to Iraqis, but it's worth a read, if for no other reason than to experience a lesson in what it means to be a leader. Bush's decision to implement the surge and to sack Rumsfeld were major turning points in the conflict, in my opinion, as clearly, Rumsfeld's reluctance to admit that his strategy of keeping troop numbers low and training Iraqi troops to do the job instead was failing, was part of the problem:

"Now, a year later, it's clear the surge has been a success. Violence is down, Baghdad mostly pacified, many Sunni leaders have abandoned their insurgency, and Al Qaeda in Iraq has been crushed (though not eliminated).

The war is not over, nor have the Iraqi government's steps toward sectarian reconciliation between Shia and Sunnis amounted to much. But should progress continue to the point that American troops begin coming home in large numbers and Iraq emerge as a reasonably secure democracy, a possibility arises: that because of his surge decision, Bush not only won the war in Iraq but saved his presidency."

[snip]

"The president had been impressed by a plan developed by his NSC (ED. National Security Council) aides with advice from a loosely knit group of retired and active duty Army officers and civilian experts. It called for adding troops, protecting Iraqi citizens, securing Baghdad, and eventually pacifying the country."

I am amazed how similar that sounds to what Alaa at The Mesopotamian was counseling a couple of years ago, especially the part about securing Baghdad. The Mesopotamian, by the way, has a great summary of the Year of the Surge in his latest entry. But, to continue:

"There was another crucial assumption shared by American military leaders: Iraqis had to step up first. Violence wouldn't subside until the new Iraqi government took tangible steps toward reconciliation between Sunnis and Shia. Reconciliation was a precondition for security."

This assumption is what lead to increasing frustration among American citizens, most especially those who had supported the war. But it was time to reassess...

"The reigning assumptions about the conflict were discarded. American troops weren't seen as targets and catalysts for violence anymore. Iraqis wanted their protection. Nor was the insurgency the biggest threat to stability. Sectarian violence, fueled by Al Qaeda in Iraq, was. To tamp it down, a new strategy was required."

[snip]

"Crouch visited Anbar and found what O'Sullivan (ED. Crouch and O'Sullivan were members of the National Security Council, an agency advising President Bush) and others had also discovered in Iraq: American soldiers were now welcomed. Anbar, once controlled by Sunni insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq, had turned. The Sunnis had revolted against their al Qaeda allies and joined forces with Americans. With more troops, U.S. officers said they could gain control of the entire Anbar region."

"On November 30, the day after Hadley's memo became public (ED: Hadley is another advisor whose memo criticizing Iraqi PM Maliki was leaked to the press), Bush met with Maliki in Amman, Jordan. He had "a couple of important factors" to work out before committing to a surge. "One was, would I have a partner to deal with in the prime minister of Iraq," Bush said. "I went out to the region to have a little sit-down with him, to get a sense of his intensity in dealing with killers, whether they be Sunni or Shia. In other words, there had to be Iraqi buy-in to any new strategy in order for it to be effective."

This one, of course, will not sit well with lefties, as they want to believe that Bush calls the shots in Iraq and the Iraqi government is only a puppet.

[snip]

"Finally, in a speech four days before Bush announced the surge, Maliki gave public assurances that Iraqi troops would be fully engaged in pacifying Baghdad and would act in a nonsectarian manner."

"In Washington, the president got little satisfaction from the interagency review of Iraq policy. Instead of a surge, the State Department favored a strategy of pulling troops out of Baghdad and allowing the Sunnis and Shia to finish their bloody struggle. When Bush heard about this idea, he rejected it out of hand. "I don't believe you can have political reconciliation if your capital city is burning," he said."

[snip]

"And if a question lingered about his intentions on Anbar, Bush answered it in his speech. "I have given orders to increase American forces in Anbar Province by 4,000 troops," he declared.

The 20-minute speech on January 10, 2007, was not Bush's most eloquent. And it wasn't greeted with applause. Democrats condemned the surge and Republicans were mostly silent. Polls showing strong public opposition to the war in Iraq were unaffected.

But the president, as best I could tell, wasn't looking for affirmation. He was focused solely on victory in Iraq. The surge may achieve that. And if it does, Bush's decision to spurn public opinion and the pressure of politics and intensify the war in Iraq will surely be regarded as the greatest of his presidency."

Of necessity, these brief passages from the article leave out a lot of the detail. Bush had to seek advise from many quarters, much of it suggesting very different strategies, in some cases, such as the Baker-Hamilton Commission, abandonment and those suggesting no change at all, both of which would surely have been catastropic.

You need to read the whole thing to get the flavour of what transpired in the fall of 2006 and early 2007. In any case, the whole scenario brings to mind the much loved poem “If” by Rudyard Kipling. I wonder if Bush ever recites this poem to himself? It surely describes the situation his presidency has had to deal with:

If you can keep your head when all about you
Are losing theirs and blaming it on you,
If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you
But make allowance for their doubting too,
If you can wait and not be tired by waiting,
Or being lied about, don't deal in lies,
Or being hated, don't give way to hating,
And yet don't look too good, nor talk too wise:
…… you'll be a Man, my son!

And THAT, my friends, is the sign of a leader.